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ABSTRACT—As class action settlement funds become more and more 
prevalent, cy pres awards have become a more common means of 
providing relief to absent class members. The primary purpose of cy pres 
awards is to provide a second-best form of relief when it is deemed 
impossible to directly compensate individual plaintiffs. Most often, these 
cy pres awards are given to some kind of charitable organization. Under 
federal law, class action settlements and cy pres awards are governed by 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e). Rule 23(e)(2) requires all class 
action settlements to be “fair, reasonable, and adequate,” but provides no 
further guidance. Thus, federal courts look to judge-made standards to 
determine the validity of a cy pres award. Numerous states have codified cy 
pres laws with specific requirements into their statutory schemes. Every 
state has an unclaimed property law. Both the state cy pres statutes and 
unclaimed property laws may conflict with federal law. This Note will 
examine how a federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction would and 
should respond where state and federal law conflict. In so doing, it will 
discuss the interplay of cy pres doctrine, the Erie doctrine, the Rules of 
Decision Act, and the Rules Enabling Act. This Note concludes by 
examining the proposal by the Rule 23 Subcommittee on Civil Rules to 
codify cy pres in Rule 23(e) and the Subcommittee’s subsequent 
withdrawal of the amendment. This conduct bolsters the conclusions that 
that a Rules Enabling Act analysis is more appropriate for these cy pres 
questions, and that federal cy pres awards may indeed violate the Rules 
Enabling Act.  
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As class action settlement funds become more and more prevalent, cy 
pres awards have become a more and more common means of providing 
relief. Cy pres comes from the French expression cy pres comme possible, 
which means “as near as possible.”1 Thus, the purpose of cy pres in the 
class action context is to provide a second-best alternative form of relief 
when direct compensation of absent class members is not possible.2 Most 
notably, cy pres awards generally refer to any class action award given to 
charitable or other nonprofit organizations that have a purpose related to 
the underlying cause of action.3 The use of cy pres awards as a tool to 
1 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 12.32 (5th ed.), Westlaw (database 
updated Dec. 2016). 
2 Id.; see also Stewart R. Shepherd, Comment, Damage Distribution in Class Actions: The Cy Pres 
Remedy, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 448, 452 (1972) (suggesting that uncollected damages in a class action can 
be distributed to the “next-best” use based on the cy pres doctrine). 
3 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 1; see also Christine P. Bartholomew, Saving Charitable Settlements, 
83 FORDHAM L. REV. 3241, 3250 (2015) (discussing cy pres in the context of class action settlements 
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distribute class action funds is extremely controversial.4 Critics suggest that 
attorneys and judges abuse cy pres distributions by dispersing the funds to 
causes completely unrelated to the cause of action, even to causes that are 
tied to the attorneys or judges.5 Supporters, on the other hand, argue that cy 
pres awards serve the interest of class members by approximating a related 
alternative to individual compensation while still deterring misbehaving 
defendants.6  
The debate reached a climax with Chief Justice Roberts’s comment in 
denying certiorari in Marek v. Lane.7 He wrote that, at some point, the 
Supreme Court should address “when, if ever, [cy pres] relief should be 
considered.”8 In April 2015, seemingly in response to Chief Justice 
Roberts, the Rule 23 Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee on Civil 
Rules (“Rule 23 Subcommittee” or “Subcommittee”)9 released a report 
suggesting an amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Federal 
Rule” or “Rule”) 23(e),10 which would add specific guidelines for 
approving cy pres remedies in a settlement agreement.11 Although the Rule 
23 Subcommittee ultimately decided to remove the cy pres amendment 
and noting that cy pres can refer to the distribution of leftover settlement funds to a charity or to a 
settlement that designated a charity as a recipient of funds at the outset). 
4 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 1; see also Martin H. Redish, Peter Julian & Samantha Zyontz, Cy Pres 
Relief and the Pathologies of the Modern Class Action: A Normative and Empirical Analysis, 62 FLA. 
L. REV. 617, 641–51 (2010); Sam Yospe, Note, Cy Pres Distributions in Class Action Settlements,
2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1014, 1021–36; George Krueger & Judd Serotta, Our Class-Action System
Is Unconstitutional, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 6, 2008, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB121798040044415147 [https://perma.cc/PAT5-SRP7]; Adam Liptak, Doling Out Other People’s
Money, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/26/washington/26bar.html
[https://perma.cc/MJ4E-ZRMJ].
5 Cecily C. Shiel, Note, A New Generation of Class Action Cy Pres Remedies: Lessons from 
Washington State, 90 WASH. L. REV. 943, 945 (2015). 
6 Wilber H. Boies & Latonia Haney Keith, Class Action Settlement Residue and Cy Pres Awards: 
Emerging Problems and Practical Solutions, 21 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 267, 269–70 (2014). 
7 134 S. Ct. 8 (2013).  
8 Id. at 9. 
9 The Rule 23 Subcommittee is responsible for “becom[ing] fully informed about pertinent issues 
regarding Rule 23 practice . . . [and] keeping an eye out to identify pertinent developments and 
concerns.” See RULE 23 SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT 1 (Apr. 2015), https://classactionblawg.files.
wordpress.com/2015/04/rule-23-subcommittee-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/9JWE-KPNK] [hereinafter 
APRIL 2015 RULE 23 SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT]. The Subcommittee releases memoranda “to share with 
the full Committee the content and fruit of the Subcommittee’s recent discussions . . . [and] present[] 
conceptual sketches of some possible amendments” to Rule 23. Id. at 2.  
10 Rule 23 defines the rules for class actions, and Rule 23(e) describes the rules for “Settlement, 
Voluntary Dismissal, or Compromise.” FED R. CIV. P. 23(e). 
11 See APRIL 2015 RULE 23 SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 9, at 23–24. For a detailed 
discussion of the proposed amendment, see infra Part V. 
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from its current reform agenda,12 cy pres awards are likely to stay in the 
public eye given Chief Justice Roberts’s comments and growing scholarly 
criticism. 
This Note, unlike previous scholarship on cy pres as a class action 
remedy, frames the discussion by examining whether a federal court sitting 
in diversity jurisdiction should apply federal or state law in determining the 
validity of a cy pres award as part of a class action settlement agreement. 
First, Part I of this Note discusses the history of cy pres law. Then, in Part 
II, this Note examines current choice of law doctrine. Based on current 
doctrine, it explores the tests federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction 
might apply to determine whether to permit cy pres settlements in 
accordance with federal law when the federal law conflicts with state law. 
The critical question that courts must answer to perform this analysis is 
whether federal cy pres doctrine is derived from Rule 23(e) or is a product 
of federal judge-made common law. Based on the Court’s Erie line of 
cases, as this Note discusses in Part III, it is likely that courts will 
determine that judge-made common law controls cy pres doctrine. Thus, 
courts will use a Rules of Decision Act13 analysis. However, in Part IV, this 
Note argues that the more appropriate approach, in light of Justice Scalia’s 
Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate Insurance Co.14 opinion in 
2010, is to examine cy pres law as derived from Rule 23(e). If courts were 
to take this approach, they would conduct a Rules Enabling Act15 analysis 
and likely conclude that federal law should apply. Part V concludes that the 
Rule 23 Subcommittee’s proposal to codify cy pres awards as a part of 
Rule 23(e) is a tacit acknowledgment that class action cy pres settlement 
remedies are in fact derived from Rule 23, even though the Subcommittee 
withdrew the recommendation. In fact, as Part V suggests, the very fact that 
the Subcommittee withdrew its proposal lends credence to the idea that cy 
pres remedies in class action settlement agreements may violate the Rules 
Enabling Act.  
12 See RULE 23 SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT 4, 46–47 (Nov. 2015), http://
www.classactioncountermeasures.com/files/2015/10/2015-1105-Rule-23-Subcommittee-Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4DWY-GSL7] [hereinafter NOVEMBER 2015 RULE 23 SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT].  
13 The Rules of Decision Act states that “[t]he laws of the several states, except where the 
Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be 
regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they 
apply.” 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2012). 
14 559 U.S. 393 (2010) (plurality opinion). 
15 The Rules Enabling Act provides the Supreme Court the power to prescribe the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure and states that “[s]uch rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.” 
§ 2072(b).
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I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CY PRES
This Part will discuss the development of cy pres law. First, this Part 
will discuss the original use of cy pres awards in the law of trusts. Then, 
this Part will discuss the development of cy pres doctrine in the realm of 
class actions. Finally, this Part will discuss modern federal courts’ use of cy 
pres awards as a class action remedy.  
A. The Historical Origin of Cy Pres in Trust Law
The doctrine of cy pres has a long, historical background. It originated 
as a tool used in trust law to honor a testator’s charitable gift as best as 
possible when it was impossible to honor the testator’s specific intent.16 It is 
not totally clear where the legal concepts surrounding cy pres began, but 
evidence points to the Roman Empire.17 The Digest of Justinian, a 
collection of Roman law, directed that gifts left by the deceased intended to 
celebrate games that had become illegal instead be put to some legal use to 
honor the deceased’s memory.18 Later, England adopted the concept of cy 
pres as an aspect of trust law, motivated by importance of charities and the 
role of the church.19 When honoring a charitable trust became impossible, 
the gift instead would be designated to a purpose that closely approximated 
the original intent of the testator.20 In England, there were two distinct types 
of cy pres: judicial and prerogative.21 Under judicial cy pres, the chancellor 
was responsible for determining the original intent of the testator and 
ensuring that the ultimate recipient of the gift honored that intent.22 On the 
other hand, the king exercised prerogative cy pres with broad discretion 
and could designate charitable gifts to causes only loosely related—or 
sometimes completely unrelated—to the donor’s original intent.23 Both 
France and Spain also adopted cy pres as part of their civil law.24 
16 EDITH L. FISCH, THE CY PRES DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED STATES § 1.00, at 1 (1950). 
17 Id. § 1.02, at 3.  
18 Id. § 1.02, at 3–4. 
19 Id. § 1.03, at 4; see also Hamish Gray, The History and Development in England of the Cy-Pres 
Principle in Charities, 33 B.U. L. REV. 30, 32–33 (1953) (noting that cy pres developed based on a 
presumption in favor of charity, and that charity in medieval England was “largely confined to the 
Church”). Often, the chancellor who exercised cy pres also was an official of the church, and suggested 
“property not specifically disposed of should be used by the executors for the good of the testator’s 
soul.” Id. at 33; see also id. (“[T]he motive of the testator in making bequests to charitable uses was 
closely linked with his own concern for the future of his soul.”). 
20 A Revaluation of Cy Pres, 49 YALE L.J. 303, 305 (1939). 
21 Id. at 303. 
22 Id. at 304–05. 
23 Id. at 305. 
24 FISCH, supra note 16, § 1.03, at 4. 
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In America, courts originally rejected use of cy pres in trust law; this 
rejection was motived by a fear that courts would have too much power and 
that the chancellor would use cy pres to benefit his own social and religious 
views rather than staying true to the donor’s original intent.25 Eventually, 
state courts affirmed cy pres to preserve charitable trusts, and currently, 
nearly every state has codified cy pres in trust law by statute.26 In general, 
courts only apply cy pres to enforce a charitable trust when: (1) the gift is 
in fact a valid charitable trust, (2) it is impossible or impracticable to honor 
the original gift, and (3) the testator had some “general charitable 
intention” to make the gift.27 Because the third requirement necessitates 
courts to judge the intent of the testator, a difficult if not impossible task, 
some states have modified or eliminated that factor.28 In the latter half of 
the twentieth century, trust law cy pres doctrine crossed over into the class 
action context.  
B. The Development of Class Action Cy Pres Doctrine
In 1966, the Federal Rules Advisory Committee dramatically altered 
Rule 23.29 Most notably, the new Rule states that in nonmandatory classes, 
absent class members are presumed to be a part of the class unless they 
proactively opt out.30 As a result, leftover funds from class-wide awards 
and class-wide settlements have become a common occurrence.31 Absent 
class members who never affirmatively join a class in the first place 
sometimes never claim their portion of the award, thus leaving a portion of 
the fund unclaimed.32 For example, in West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & 
Co.,33 $32 million of a $100 million settlement was unclaimed.34 
25 Jennifer Johnston, Comment, Cy Pres Comme Possible to Anything is Possible: How Cy Pres 
Creates Improper Incentives in Class Action Settlements, 9 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 277, 280 (2013). 
26 Redish et al., supra note 4, at 628 & n.59 (citing the statutes of forty-six states and the District of 
Columbia). 
27 FISCH, supra note 16, § 5.00, at 128.  
28 Redish et al., supra note 4, at 629–30 (noting, for example, that the Pennsylvania legislature 
removed the intent requirement, the Connecticut Supreme Court eliminated the intent requirement, and 
in Massachusetts the intent requirement is presumed to be satisfied absent clear alternative intent). 
29 See Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 356 (1967). 
30 Redish et al., supra note 4, at 630; see FED R. CIV. P. 23(c)(3)(B). 
31 Johnston, supra note 25, at 281. 
32 This often is the case when the damage awards are so small that individual absent plaintiffs are 
not sufficiently incentivized to fill out and mail the paperwork required to claim their part of the award. 
See Redish et al., supra note 4, at 631. 
33 314 F. Supp. 710, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff’d, 440 F.2d 1079, 1082 (2d Cir. 1971). 
34 Johnston, supra note 25, at 281 (citing Pfizer, 314 F. Supp. 710). 
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Traditionally, unclaimed class action settlement funds have simply 
reverted back to the defendants, but such a result was criticized because it 
decreased the deterrent impact of civil litigation on defendants’ activities.35 
A 1972 student comment by Stewart Shepherd was the first to suggest an 
alternative: cy pres awards in the class action context.36 Shepherd suggested 
that unclaimed funds could be distributed to the “next-best recipient” in a 
process “analogous to the doctrine of cy pres.”37 To distribute leftover 
funds through use of a cy pres award, he argued, courts should attempt to 
determine alternative recipients whom the legislature would prefer, trying 
to stay as true as possible to the legislature’s intent.38 He suggested three 
approaches: “(1) distribution to those class members who come forward to 
collect their damages, (2) distribution through the state in its capacity as 
parens patriae or by escheat, and (3) distribution through the market.”39 
Although Shepherd acknowledged that the best option was to distribute the 
funds to injured parties, he argued that “[a]s it becomes more difficult, or 
even impossible, to ascertain which alternate recipients the legislature 
would prefer, it may be appropriate to devote the funds to a broader public 
service in order to maximize the benefit to society.”40 In 1987, new 
scholarship suggested that an acceptable “next best” form of compensation 
was a donation to a charity or nonprofit organization that is at least loosely 
related to the class members’ injuries.41 
35 See Redish et al., supra note 4, at 631. 
36 See Shepherd, supra note 2, at 452. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 453; see also RUBENSTEIN, supra note 1, § 12.32 (“The class action analogy is strained but 
works by assuming that the court, as when it redirects a settlor’s money from one set of beneficiaries to 
another, is simply redirecting money from one set of beneficiaries (absent class members) to an entity 
whose interests lie ‘as near as possible’ to that group—namely, a charity working on issues related to 
the group’s underlying causes of action—rather than have the monies revert to the defendant.” (footnote 
omitted)).  
39 Shepherd, supra note 2, at 453. Parens patriae is “[a] doctrine by which a government has 
standing to prosecute a lawsuit on behalf of a citizen.” Parens Patriae, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(10th ed. 2014). Escheat is the “[r]eversion of property . . . to the state.” Escheat, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
40 Shepherd, supra note 2, at 452–53. 
41 Redish et al., supra note 4, at 633–34 (noting that under this theory of cy pres, unclaimed funds 
would be formed into a charitable trust to be donated to an existing charitable organization or used to 
create a new charitable foundation); see also Kerry Barnett, Note, Equitable Trusts: An Effective 
Remedy in Consumer Class Actions, 96 YALE L.J. 1591, 1605 (1987); Natalie A. DeJarlais, Note, The 
Consumer Trust Fund: A Cy Pres Solution to Undistributed Funds in Consumer Class Actions, 
38 HASTINGS L.J. 729, 759 (1987). 
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C. Class Action Cy Pres Awards in Federal Courts
In modern American law, federal courts use cy pres doctrine as a 
remedy in the class action context under two related but distinct scenarios. 
First, a cy pres award can be used when, after funds from a settlement are 
distributed to the class members, excess funds remain in the original 
settlement pot.42 The excess funds are often a consequence of failing to 
locate absent class members, absent class members failing to file their 
claims, or absent class members failing to cash their checks.43 
Alternatively, excess funds may result when it is economically 
impracticable to send awards to absent class members.44 This most 
commonly occurs when individual damages are so low that the 
administrative costs of sending the funds are greater than the value of the 
individual awards themselves.45 Second, cy pres remedies included as part 
of settlement agreements themselves have become more and more 
common.46 In these instances, the plaintiff class and defendant agree, as 
part of the settlement, that a portion of the settlement money will go to a 
designated charity.47 
The first use of cy pres as a tool for determining a class action remedy 
in the federal courts came in Miller v. Steinbach48 in 1974. The District 
Court for the Southern District of New York recognized that there was no 
precedent for or against a cy pres award as a portion of a settlement 
agreement and that a cy pres award would “certainly not . . . benefit those 
on whose behalf the action was brought.”49 Nevertheless, because 
“individual recoveries would be de minimus by almost any standard,” the 
court approved the settlement agreement—including the cy pres award—
noting that “no alternative [was] realistically possible.”50 Since Miller, no 
clear judicially enforced standard has developed to determine the validity 




46 See Redish et al., supra note 4, at 653. 
47 See Johnston, supra note 25, at 284 (“In its modern form [cy pres] permits the distribution of 
funds to uninterested parties before there are even any residual funds left over.”); see also 
Bartholomew, supra note 3, at 3250. Although Professor Bartholomew attempts to distinguish 
charitable settlements—in which a charity is chosen to receive money as part of the settlement—from 
other cy pres awards, she acknowledges that no other scholar has made that distinction. Id. This Note 
will consider charitable settlements as a form of cy pres.  
48 No. 66 Civ. 356, 1974 WL 350 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 1974). 
49 Id. at *2. 
50 Id. 
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of cy pres awards.51 Instead, cy pres awards have been evaluated somewhat 
inconsistently under both the requirements of Rule 23(e) and judge-made 
common law.52 According to Rule 23(e), the court must approve class 
action settlements,53 and for settlements to be upheld, they must be “fair, 
reasonable, and adequate.”54 However, the Federal Rules do not specify a 
judicial standard for determining whether a settlement passes the Rule 
23(e) test, and to fill this void, federal courts have created common law 
requirements.55 
The Supreme Court first addressed cy pres awards as a class action 
remedy in 2013. In Lane v. Facebook, Inc.,56 plaintiffs filed a class action 
against Facebook. They alleged that Facebook violated their privacy rights 
as a result of the Beacon program, which updated Facebook members’ 
profiles based on actions the members took on websites that contracted 
with Facebook.57 The parties agreed to a $9.5 million settlement; $6.5 
million took the form of a cy pres award to a new charity organization to 
provide education on online privacy law.58 Notably, Facebook’s Director of 
Public Policy was one of three individuals selected to serve on the board of 
directors of the new organization, and counsel for Facebook sat on the 
organization’s Board of Legal Advisors.59 Thus, because Facebook 
maintained significant control over the cy pres recipient—the new charity 
organization—there were serious concerns about the award and a potential 
conflict of interest.60 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the settlement, holding that 
the settlement as a whole—including the cy pres award—was 
“fundamentally fair,” satisfying the requirements of Rule 23(e).61 The court 
held that it was both infeasible to provide monetary payments to the absent 
51 See Shiel, supra note 5, at 951; see also Bartholomew, supra note 3, at 3256 (noting that courts 
have a “great deal of judicial discretion” in considering the validity of cy pres awards, leading “to 
inconsistent decisions over similar charitable settlements”); Goutam U. Jois, The Cy Pres Problem and 
the Role of Damages in Tort Law, 16 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 258, 263 (2008) (noting that “courts are 
free to do almost anything with undistributed class funds,” leading “to a system that is ad hoc, 
unpredictable, unguided by any normative principle, and open to the possibility of abuse”). 
52 For a discussion on the implications of the determination as to whether class action cy pres 
awards are controlled by Rule 23(e) or judge-made common law, see infra Parts III–V. 
53 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e). 
54 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2). 
55 See infra Section III.A. 
56 696 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2012), reh’g denied, 709 F.3d 791 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied sub nom. 
Marek v. Lane, 134 S. Ct. 8 (2013). 
57 Id. at 816. 
58 Id. at 817. 
59 Id. at 817–18.  
60 See Rhonda Wasserman, Cy Pres in Class Action Settlements, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 97, 133 (2014). 
61 Facebook, 696 F.3d at 825.  
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class members and that there was a sufficient nexus between the 
organization and the harm that the plaintiffs suffered.62 Judge Andrew 
Kleinfeld dissented and asserted that the settlement failed to meet the 
“higher standard of fairness” required to satisfy Rule 23(e).63 Judge 
Kleinfeld was concerned about the incentive for collusion, as he noted that 
“there [was] nothing to stop Facebook and class counsel from managing the 
charity to serve their interests.”64 
Even though the Supreme Court denied certiorari, Chief Justice 
Roberts took the unusual step of issuing a statement from the bench, stating 
that when a more suitable case presents itself, the Court should consider 
“when, if ever, [cy pres] relief should be considered” and should “clarify 
the limits on the use of such remedies.”65 Specifically, Chief Justice 
Roberts was interested in examining “how to assess . . . fairness [of cy 
pres] as a general matter,” how to choose entities to receive the cy pres 
award, whether new entities could be formed as part of the relief, how to 
delineate responsibility between the judge and parties in forming the cy 
pres remedy, and “how closely the goals of any enlisted organization must 
correspond to the interests of the class.”66 As demonstrated by Chief Justice 
Roberts’s statement accompanying this denial of certiorari, the law 
regarding federal cy pres awards as part of class action settlement 
agreements is in flux.  
D. Cy Pres Class Recovery and State Law
For purposes of this Note, it is necessary to examine two types of state 
law that may conflict with federal cy pres law. First, unlike the Federal 
Rules Advisory Committee, many state legislatures have explicitly codified 
cy pres awards as a form of class action remedy that can be agreed to in a 
settlement. These statutes differ in the type of remedy they allow, and 
therefore the state statutes’ cy pres guidelines may conflict with federal cy 
pres law’s flexible requirements. Second, every state has an unclaimed 
property law allowing a state to collect property that goes unclaimed. In the 
class action context, unclaimed settlement funds may be considered 
unclaimed property. Thus, the question becomes whether unclaimed 
settlement funds can be distributed to a cy pres recipient per federal law or 
should escheat to the state based on the state’s unclaimed property statute. 
62 Id. at 821. 
63 Id. at 831 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (quoting Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th 
Cir. 1998)).  
64 Id. at 834. 
65 Marek v. Lane, 134 S. Ct. 8, 9 (2013). 
66 Id. 
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1. State Cy Pres Laws.—Twenty-one states have codified specific
rules regarding cy pres awards.67 These state laws have varying levels of 
restrictiveness.68 The states of Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, 
Montana, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South 
Dakota, Washington, and Wisconsin require that settlement funds be 
disbursed to legal aid organizations.69 On the other hand, California, 
Hawaii, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New Mexico, and Tennessee have 
67 The states with codified cy pres rules are: California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, 
Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North 
Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Washington, and 
Wisconsin. See MEREDITH MCBURNEY, AM. BAR ASS’N, LEGISLATION AND COURT RULES PROVIDING 
FOR LEGAL AID TO RECEIVE CLASS ACTION RESIDUALS (2017), http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ATJReports/ls_cypres.authcheckdam.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GS7K-6XX3]. 
68 See Emily C. Baker & Lynsey M. Barron, Cy Pres . . . Say What? State Laws Governing 
Disbursement of Residual Class-Action Funds, http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/d5da170f-
e20d-4f96-aec1-12cf62115d70/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/fbbc24cf-ffcd-43ed-98ba-
be026d39ef17/cypres2.pdf [https://perma.cc/3EG3-GEZ9] (“There is wide variation . . . in terms of 
whether the cy pres statutes are mandatory, the default, or merely suggested.”). 
69 See COLO. R. CIV. P. 23(g) (“[N]ot less than fifty percent (50%) of the residual funds shall be 
disbursed to the Colorado Lawyer Trust Account Foundation (COLTAF) to support activities and 
programs that promote access to the civil justice system for low income residents of Colorado); 735 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 5/2-807 (2017) (requiring that at least 50% of residual funds be disbursed to “eligible 
organizations,” which must “promot[e] or provid[e] services that would be eligible for funding under 
the Illinois Equal Justice Act”); IND. R. TRIAL P. 23(F)(2) (“[N]ot less than twenty-five percent (25%) 
of the residual funds shall be disbursed to the Indiana Bar Foundation to support the activities and 
programs of the Indiana Pro Bono Commission and its pro bono districts.”); KY. R. CIV. P. 23.05(6)(b) 
(“[N]ot less than twenty-five percent (25%) of the residual funds shall be disbursed to the Civil Rule 23 
Account . . . to be allocated to the Kentucky Civil Legal Aid Organizations . . . to support activities and 
programs that promote access to the civil justice system for low-income residents of Kentucky.”); 
MONT. R. CIV. P. 23(i)(3) (“[N]ot less than fifty percent (50%) of the residual funds shall be disbursed 
to an Access to Justice Organization to support activities and programs that promote access to the 
Montana civil justice system.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-267.10(b) (2016) (“[T]he court . . . shall direct the 
defendant to pay the sum of the unpaid residue . . . to the Indigent Person’s Attorney Fund and to the 
North Carolina State Bar for the provision of civil legal services for indigents.”); OR. R. CIV. P. 32(O) 
(“At least 50 percent of the amount not paid to class members [shall] be paid or delivered to the Oregon 
State Bar for the funding of legal services provided through [Oregon’s] Legal Services Program . . . .”); 
PA. R. CIV. P. 1716 (“Not less than fifty percent (50%) of residual funds in a given class action shall be 
disbursed to the Pennsylvania Interest on Lawyers Trust Account Board to support activities and 
programs which promote the delivery of civil legal assistance to the indigent in Pennsylvania by non-
profit corporations . . . .”); S.C. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2) (“[N]ot less than fifty percent of residuals must be 
distributed to the South Carolina Bar Foundation to support activities and programs that promote access 
to the civil justice system for low income residents of South Carolina.”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 16-2-
57 (2017) (requiring that at least 50% of residual funds be disbursed “to the Commission on Equal 
Access to Our Courts”); WIS. STAT. § 803.08(2) (2017) (“[N]ot less than fifty percent of the residual 
funds shall be disbursed to [the Wisconsin Trust Account Foundation] to support direct delivery of legal 
services to persons of limited means in non-criminal matters.”); WASH. SUPER. CT. CIV. R. 23(f)(2) 
(“[N]ot less than twenty-five percent (25%) of the residual funds shall be disbursed to the Legal 
Foundation of Washington to support activities and programs that promote access to the civil justice 
system for low income residents of Washington State.”). 
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codified cy pres awards but do not specify a particular charitable 
organization to receive the funds; these states expressly allow—but do not 
mandate—legal aid organizations to be the recipient.70 Finally, Connecticut, 
Maine, and Nebraska have codified class action cy pres awards by 
specifying particular legal aid charities to receive the award, but provide 
the court and litigants discretion to choose a different charitable 
organization that may do a better job of representing the interests of the 
plaintiff class and may better serve as a second-best alternative to 
compensating the class members directly.71  
While the states which have codified specific rules regarding cy pres 
give some direction as to distribution, they give no guidance as to whether 
a federal court sitting in diversity should follow state or federal law. Thus, 
if a federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction in any of these twenty-one 
states is confronted with a cy pres remedy, must the court follow the 
specific requirements of the state law or the requirements of federal law?72 
2. State Unclaimed Property Laws.—The other state law source of
guidance for distributing unclaimed settlement funds are unclaimed 
property statutes. State unclaimed property laws require that holders of 
certain types of intangible property give the property to the state if the 
property is unclaimed for a specified time period.73 All fifty states and the 
70 See CAL. CODE CIV. P. § 384(b) (providing that residual funds should be distributed “to 
nonprofit organizations or foundations to support projects that will benefit the class or similarly situated 
persons, or that promote the law consistent with the objectives and purposes of the underlying cause of 
action, to child advocacy programs, or to nonprofit organizations providing civil legal services to the 
indigent”); HAW. R. CIV. P. 23(f) (providing that residual funds can be distributed to various nonprofit 
organizations, including legal aid organizations); LA. SUP. CT. R. XLIII(2) (providing that cy pres funds 
“may be disbursed . . . to one or more non-profit or governmental entities . . . including the Louisiana 
Bar Foundation”); MASS. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2) (providing that “residual funds . . . shall be disbursed to 
one or more nonprofit organizations or foundations (which may include nonprofit organizations that 
provide legal services to low income persons)”); N.M. R. CIV. P. DIST. CT. 1-023(G)(2) (providing that 
residual funds can be disbursed to, amongst other options, “nonprofit organizations that provide legal 
services to low income persons”); TENN. R. CIV. P. 23.08 (providing that the “[d]istribution of residual 
funds to a program or fund which serves the pro bono legal needs of Tennesseans . . . is permissable 
[sic] but not required”).  
71 See CONN. R. SUPER. CT. CIV. R. 9-9(g)(2) (providing that residual funds should be disbursed 
“for the purpose of funding those organizations that provide legal services for the poor in Connecticut” 
absent a designation by the parties); ME. R. CIV. P. 23(f)(2) (providing that residual funds should be 
disbursed to the Maine Bar Foundation unless the parties agree on another entity to receive the funds); 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-319.01 (2017) (providing that residual funds should be paid to the Legal Aid and 
Services Fund “unless [the court] orders otherwise to further the purposes of the underlying cause of 
action”).  
72 For a discussion of the answer to this question, see infra Parts III–V. 
73 Ethan D. Millar & John L. Coalson, Jr., The Pot of Gold at the End of the Class Action Lawsuit: 
Can States Claim It as Unclaimed Property?, 70 U. PITT. L. REV. 511, 515 (2009). 
111:1097 (2017) Cy Pres Awards and the Erie Doctrine 
1109 
District of Columbia have unclaimed property laws.74 According to all of 
the states’ unclaimed property laws, when the unclaimed property remits to 
the state from the holder, the title of the property stays with the owner of 
the unclaimed property, rather than with the state, and the owner of the 
unclaimed property can always reclaim the property from the state.75 The 
main purpose of unclaimed property laws is to help owners reclaim missing 
property.76 However, courts have also recognized a secondary purpose: “to 
give the state . . . the benefit of the use of the property until the owner 
reclaims it (or never reclaims it).”77 
In the class action settlement context, plaintiff class members are the 
owners and the defendant is the holder of the unclaimed property—the 
funds leftover in a settlement fund that were supposed to go to members of 
the plaintiff class as specified in the settlement agreement.78 For purposes 
of this Note, state unclaimed property laws are relevant in situations where 
a federal district court, sitting in diversity jurisdiction, decides to distribute 
unclaimed funds from a class action settlement fund to a charity or 
nonprofit via a cy pres award despite the requirement of the relevant state’s 
unclaimed property law that unclaimed property must remit to the state.79 
II. ERIE AND CHOICE OF LAW DOCTRINE
When a federal court sits in diversity jurisdiction, if one party believes 
that the court should use federal law and the other party believes the court 
should use state law, the federal court must decide which law should apply. 
This decision has been and continues to be one of great confusion. For 
purposes of this Note, it is necessary to understand the important myth 
debunked by Chief Justice Warren in Hanna v. Plumer80 with respect to the 
Erie doctrine. The myth stated that the Erie line of cases provided the 
appropriate test to determine the applicability of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure in a federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction where a Rule 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 516 (“The state . . . acts as a mere custodian or conservator for the owner.”). 
76 Id. at 516–17 (noting that the state must affirmatively try to find the owner of unclaimed 
property, and if unsuccessful, must hold the property until the owner collects it). 
77 Id. at 517 (citing cases). 
78 Id. at 515.  
79 See, e.g., All Plaintiffs v. All Defendants, 645 F.3d 329, 331 (5th Cir. 2011). In this situation, a 
state may argue that the court must apply the state’s unclaimed property law—requiring that unclaimed 
funds be remitted to the state—rather than federal cy pres law. Id. at 332. The settling parties and cy 
pres beneficiary, on the other hand, will likely argue that the court should apply federal law and allow 
the cy pres distribution, specifically pointing to Rule 23(e) governing settlement agreements. Id. For a 
discussion on this disagreement, see Parts III–IV. 
80 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
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conflicts with state law.81 Professor John Ely masterfully articulated the 
clear distinction drawn by Chief Justice Warren in this case:  
[W]here there is no relevant Federal Rule of Civil Procedure or other Rule
promulgated pursuant to the [Rules] Enabling Act and the federal rule in issue
is therefore wholly judge-made, whether state or federal law should be applied
is controlled by the Rules of Decision Act, the statute construed in Erie and
York. Where the matter in issue is covered by a Federal Rule, however, the
Enabling Act—and not the Rules of Decision Act itself or the line of cases
construing it—constitutes the relevant standard.82
In other words, where one party argues that federal law controls, and the 
other party argues that state law controls, the first question a federal court 
sitting in diversity jurisdiction must ask is whether the federal law is 
covered by a Federal Rule promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to 
the Rules Enabling Act. 
The subsequent analysis conducted by a court is dramatically different 
depending on whether the question of federal law is controlled by a Federal 
Rule. If there is no Federal Rule providing the federal standard—and 
instead, the federal law in question stems from judge-made common law—
the Rules of Decision Act controls the court’s choice of law analysis. The 
Rules of Decision Act states that “[t]he laws of the several states, except 
where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress 
otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil 
actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply.”83  
On the other hand, if a Federal Rule does control the federal standard, 
a federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction need not consider the Rules 
of Decision Act or the Court’s Erie line of cases in determining whether to 
apply the state or federal law. Instead, the court must look to the Rules 
Enabling Act, which states that “[t]he Supreme Court shall have the power 
to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure [i.e., the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure] . . . for cases in the United States district courts . . . and 
courts of appeals.”84 The Act requires that the Federal Rule “shall not 
abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.”85 Under a Rules Enabling 
81 Id. at 469–70. 
82 John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 698 (1974); see also Shady 
Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 417 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment) (noting that when “no federal rule applies, a federal court must follow 
the Rules of Decision Act . . . [b]ut when a situation is covered by a [F]ederal [R]ule, the Rules of 
Decision Act inquiry by its own terms does not apply [and] [i]nstead, the Rules Enabling Act . . . 
controls” (citing Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471)). 
83 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2012). 
84 Id. § 2072(a).  
85 Id. § 2072(b). 
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Act analysis, the court must first determine whether the Federal Rule 
applies to the disputed issue, and then must determine whether the Rule 
complies with the requirements of the Rules Enabling Act.86 
This Part will discuss how a court is to determine whether the federal 
law is controlled by a Federal Rule or judge-made common law. Then, this 
Part will discuss the analytical steps a federal court sitting in diversity 
jurisdiction must perform to determine whether state or federal law governs 
under either scenario.  
A. Choosing Between the Rules of Decision Act and Rules Enabling Act
Although Chief Justice Warren’s distinction between the Rules
Enabling Act and Rules of Decision Act may seem clear, it requires an 
additional line of analysis: courts must first actually determine whether the 
issue is covered by a Federal Rule before determining whether to conduct a 
Rules Enabling Act or Rules of Decision Act analysis.87 Generally, as one 
scholar has stated, the court determines if a Federal Rule is “pertinent” to 
the disputed issue.88 Often, a court asks whether the Rule is “sufficiently 
broad” to “control” or “govern” the legal issue facing the court.89 Such a 
determination is not as straightforward as one might expect.  
On several occasions, the Court has held that the scope of the Federal 
Rules is somewhat narrow. In other words, the Court has implied that when 
there is doubt, it should be assumed that common law rather than the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure creates the federal standard, and thus, a 
Rules of Decision Act analysis should be used.90 For example, in Gasperini 
v. Center for Humanities, Inc.,91 a federal court sitting in diversity
jurisdiction had to decide if it should use federal or state law in determining
whether to order a new trial based on an excessive jury verdict.92 New York
law allowed courts to order a new trial for excessive verdicts “when the
86 Robert J. Condlin, Is the Supreme Court Disabling the Enabling Act, or Is Shady Grove Just 
Another Bad Opera?, 47 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 1–2 (2016). 
87 See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., 559 U.S. at 398 (plurality opinion) (“The framework for 
our decision [as to whether state or federal law should apply] is familiar. We must first determine 
whether [the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] answers the question in dispute.”); Adam N. Steinman, 
Our Class Action Federalism: Erie and the Rules Enabling Act After Shady Grove, 86 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1131, 1145 (2011) (“Put simply, there is a difference between state law conflicting with a Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure . . . and state law conflicting with the federal judiciary’s gloss on a Federal 
Rule whose text provides only a vague or ambiguous standard . . . .”). 
88 Condlin, supra note 86, at 1–2. 
89 Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749–51 (1980).  
90 See, e.g., Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 437 n.22 (1996); Walker, 446 U.S. 
at 749–53. 
91 518 U.S. 415. 
92 Id. at 418–19. 
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jury’s award ‘deviate[d] materially from what would be reasonable 
compensation.’”93 By contrast, Federal Rule 59 governs motions for a new 
trial in the case of an excessive jury verdict.94 But as the Court held, Rule 
59 says nothing about the judicial standard to be used.95 The federal law 
test used to determine whether compensation is excessive is the “shock the 
conscience” test, a test that came from judge-made law.96 Thus, under 
Hanna, the Court held that a Rules of Decision analysis was appropriate.97 
On the other hand, however, the Court does not always hold such a 
narrow view. In Hanna, for example, the Court determined that the Court 
should only use a Rules of Decision Act analysis if the Federal Rule is 
inapplicable to the federal law at issue.98 Likewise, in Shady Grove,99 the 
Court faced the decision of whether a New York federal district court 
sitting in diversity jurisdiction must follow Federal Rule 23, which permits 
class certification in all cases so long as one of the 23(a) and one of the 
23(b)(3) requirements are met,100 or instead follow a New York statute, 
which completely bars class actions for penalty interest cases.101 Justice 
Scalia wrote the opinion for the Court.102 First, writing for a five-Justice 
93 Id. at 418 (quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5501(c) (McKinney 1995)). 
94 See FED. R. CIV. P. 59. 
95 Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 437 n.22.  
96 Id. at 429. 
97 Id. at 437 n.22; see Adam N. Steinman, Kryptonite for CAFA?, 32 REV. LITIG. 649, 675 (2013) 
(noting that the Gasperini Court held that “[t]he shock-the-conscience standard was a kind of federal 
procedural common law, not a standard dictated by Rule 59 itself”). For an additional Supreme Court 
decision holding that a Rules of Decision Act analysis should be used where there is a judicially created 
standard regarding a Federal Rule, see Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749–53 (1980) 
(holding that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3 does not cover the choice of law issue of when a statute 
of limitations begins to run, and thus employed a Rules of Decision Act analysis). 
98 See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 469–71 (1965); see also Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. 
Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 398 (2010) (plurality opinion) (“We do not wade into Erie’s murky 
waters unless the Federal Rule is inapplicable or invalid.” (citing Hanna, 380 U.S. at 469–71)). 
99 559 U.S. 393. 
100 See id. at 398 (noting that Rule 23 allows a “‘class action [to] be maintained’ if two conditions 
are met”: (1) the suit satisfies the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) and (2) fits into one of the categories of 
Rule 23(b) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23)). 
101 Id. at 398–99; see N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 901(b) (McKinney 2017) (“Unless a statute creating or 
imposing a penalty, or a minimum measure of recovery specifically authorizes the recovery thereof in a 
class action, an action to recover a penalty, or minimum measure of recovery created or imposed by 
statute may not be maintained as a class action.”). 
102 Justice Scalia was joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas, Justice Sotomayor, and 
Justice Stevens, a five-person majority, for Part II.A of his opinion which discussed whether the federal 
law was controlled by Rule 23. For the rest of his opinion, however, Justice Scalia did not garner a 
majority. For Parts II.B and II.D, Justice Scalia was joined by only Chief Justice Roberts, Justice 
Thomas, and Justice Sotomayor, and for Part II.C, Justice Scalia was joined by only Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justice Thomas. 
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majority, Justice Scalia held that Rule 23 and § 901(b) do in fact conflict.103 
The majority also held that Rule 23, rather than judicial common law, 
governed the federal law at issue.104 Thus, according to a majority of the 
Court, a Rules Enabling Act analysis was appropriate. Even though Justice 
Scalia could only garner a plurality for the rest of his opinion,105 unlike the 
majority opinions in Walker and Gasperini, the Court in Shady Grove held 
that a Federal Rule was broad enough to trigger a Rules Enabling Act 
analysis and displace the state law.  
In Shady Grove, the Federal Rule was found to control even though 
some of the Rule 23 requirements are anything but clear. For example, the 
class action at issue in Shady Grove—like most controversial class 
actions—invokes Rule 23(b)(3), requiring that “questions of law or fact 
common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only 
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available 
methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”106 As one 
scholar recognizes, the terms “predominate” and “superior” are particularly 
vague; there is “no precise formula” for how a court should determine 
predominance and superiority, “and the text of Rule 23 provides no 
answers.”107 Instead, federal courts develop common law to define these 
terms. This judge-made federal law could take either a more hostile or a 
more tolerant position toward class action certification than state law.108 
Nevertheless, as noted above, a majority of the Court joined Justice 
Scalia’s opinion holding that Rule 23 “answers the question in dispute.”109 
103 Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., 559 U.S. at 399 (holding that Rule 23 and § 901(b) “attempt[] 
to answer the same question,” whether the suit “may not be maintained as a class action because of the 
relief it seeks” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Shady Grove dissent, by contrast, held that 
“Rule 23 does not collide with § 901(b) . . . [because] Rule 23 prescribes the considerations relevant to 
class certification and postcertification proceedings—but it does not command that a particular remedy 
be available when a party sues in a representative capacity.” Id. at 446 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). In 
other words, Justice Ginsburg argued that “Rule 23 governs procedural aspects of class litigation” while 
the New York state statute “control[s] the size of [the] monetary award a class plaintiff may pursue.” Id. 
at 446–47.  
104 Id. at 406 (majority opinion) (“Rule 23 unambiguously authorizes any plaintiff, in any federal 
civil proceeding, to maintain a class action if the Rule’s prerequisites are met.”). 
105 While both Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion and Justice Stevens’s concurrence determined that 
Rule 23 did not violate the Rules Enabling Act, Justice Stevens took an approach more deferential to 
state law. See Steinman, supra note 87, at 1140–41; see also infra note 134.  
106 FED R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (emphasis added). 
107 Steinman, supra note 87, at 1145. 
108 Id. 
109 Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., 559 U.S. at 398 (plurality opinion); see Condlin, supra note 
86, at 26; Steinman, supra note 87, at 1138. 
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Such an approach may suggest that the scope of the Federal Rules may be 
broader than it appeared after Gasperini and Walker.110  
B. Conducting Rules of Decision Act and Rules Enabling Act Analyses
After determining whether judge-made common law or a Federal Rule
controls the federal law, a federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction must 
conduct a Rules of Decision Act analysis (for judge-made common law) or 
a Rules Enabling Act analysis (for a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure) and 
determine whether the federal or state law should apply. 
First, to determine whether the Rules of Decision Act requires a 
federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction to use state law, courts rely on 
the Erie line of cases.111 In Hanna, the Court developed the “modified 
outcome determination test”;112 under this approach, a court analyzes a 
Rules of Decision Act question based on “the twin aims of the Erie rule: 
discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable 
administration of the laws.”113 The Hanna modified outcome determination 
test replaced the former Guaranty Trust Co. v. York “outcome-
determination” test,114 which required the court to ask whether “it 
significantly affect[ed] the result of a litigation for a federal court to 
disregard a law of a State that would be controlling in an action upon the 
same claim by the same parties in a State court.”115 While the Hanna Court 
described the modified outcome determination test as having “twin aims,” 
in reality, the test comes down to the single concern: whether the difference 
in outcome from using the state as opposed to federal law would result in 
an unfair result to the litigants.116 If the difference in outcome would result 
110 See supra notes 90–97 and accompanying text. 
111 See Ely, supra note 82, at 698. This line of cases began in 1938, when the Court held that where 
federal law and state law conflict, under the Rules of Decision Act a federal court sitting in diversity 
jurisdiction must apply the substantive law of the state. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 
(1938). The Court’s Erie decision overruled the Swift v. Tyson doctrine, which allowed federal courts to 
apply their own federal common law. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).  
112 Martin H. Redish & Carter G. Phillips, Erie and the Rules of Decision Act: In Search of the 
Appropriate Dilemma, 91 HARV. L. REV. 356, 360 (1977) (referring to the Hanna test as the “modified 
outcome determination test”). 
113 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965).  
114 Id. at 468; see Redish & Phillips, supra note 112, at 362. 
115 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).  
116 See Redish & Phillips, supra note 112, at 373 (“While the Court identified [the twin aims of 
Erie] as distinct, it seems clear that its focus reduces to a single concern: fairness to the litigants . . . 
[and] how forum shopping brings about unfairness or inequality.”); see also Gasperini v. Ctr. for 
Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 428 (1996) (stating that the Court must determine whether using federal 
law would “have so important an effect upon the fortunes of one or both of the litigants that failure to 
[apply] it would [unfairly discriminate against citizens of the forum State, or] be likely to cause a 
plaintiff to choose the federal court” (alteration in original) (quoting Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468 n.9)). 
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in an unfair result, under the modified outcome determination test, the court 
must defer to state law.117 
Nearly twenty years after Hanna, Justice Ginsburg further 
complicated the analysis. In Gasperini,118 Justice Ginsburg invoked Byrd v. 
Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc..119 The Byrd case, decided 
seven years prior to Hanna, involved the question of whether a factual 
issue should be decided by a judge, per state law, or by a jury, per federal 
law.120 In Byrd, the Court created a balancing test to examine Rules of 
Decision Act questions. The Court considered (1) the state’s interest in 
state substantive policy serving as controlling law in diversity cases,121 (2) 
the federal interest in using federal procedure in federal courts,122 and (3) 
the litigant’s interest in not having the outcome turn on whether the case is 
adjudicated in federal or state court,123 and then balanced those three 
interests.124  
In Gasperini, Justice Ginsburg held that an “‘outcome-determination 
test’ was an insufficient guide in cases presenting countervailing federal 
interests.”125 According to Justice Ginsburg’s interpretation, based on the 
Court’s holding in Byrd, countervailing federal interests are at play where 
the diversity suit involves “the allocation of trial functions between judge 
and jury” or “the allocation of authority to review verdicts.”126 Justice 
Ginsburg held that in these situations, where the distribution of factfinding 
responsibility between the judge and the jury is at issue, instead of simply 
looking to whether there is an impact on fairness to the litigants, the Byrd 
balancing test is appropriate.127 
117 Hanna, 380 U.S. at 467–68.  
118 518 U.S. 415 (1996). 
119 356 U.S. 525 (1958). 
120 Id. at 533–34. 
121 Id. at 535–36 (examining whether the procedure at dispute was “bound up” with the substantive 
state “rights and obligations” of the parties being enforced). 
122 Id. at 538 (examining the federal interest in using the federal procedure and requiring a jury). 
123 Id. at 537 (examining whether “the outcome would be substantially affected by whether the 
issue . . . is decided by a judge or a jury”). 
124 See Redish & Phillips, supra note 112, at 362–63. For a discussion of three possible approaches 
to the Byrd balancing approach, see id. at 364–66. 
125 Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 432 (1996).  
126 Id.  
127 See id. at 431–32; see also LINDA MULLENIX, MARTIN REDISH & GEORGENE VAIRO,
UNDERSTANDING FEDERAL COURTS AND JURISDICTION 680–81 (2d ed. 2015) (noting that when an Erie 
issue involves the functions of the judge and the jury, the Byrd balancing test applies); Thomas D. 
Rowe, Jr., Not Bad for Government Work: Does Anyone Else Think the Supreme Court Is Doing a 
Halfway Decent Job in Its Erie-Hanna Jurisprudence?, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 963, 1014 (1998) 
(recognizing that when the allocation of power between the judge and jury is in dispute, the analysis 
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On the other hand, the analysis of an issue contained in the Federal 
Rules under the Rules Enabling Act is quite different. When a court 
determines that an issue is controlled by a Federal Rule, the federal court 
sitting in diversity jurisdiction must apply the federal law rather than state 
law unless the Federal Rule violates the Rules Enabling Act or the 
Constitution.128 In other words, the court must apply the Federal Rule so 
long as the Rule is a “rule[] of practice and procedure” and does “not 
abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.”129 Only if the Rule 
violates the Rules Enabling Act will the court apply state law. Because the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are promulgated and approved by the 
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, the Judicial Conference, and the 
Supreme Court, the rules have a presumption of validity.130 In Burlington 
Northern Railroad Co. v. Woods, the case that established the current Rules 
Enabling Act analysis standard,131 the Court held that if a Federal Rule is 
“reasonably necessary to maintain the integrity of th[e] system of rules,” 
then even a Rule that “incidentally affect[s] litigants’ substantive rights 
do[es] not violate [the Rules Enabling Act].”132 The Burlington Northern 
test is very deferential to the Federal Rules. Indeed, the Court has “rejected 
every statutory challenge to a Federal Rule that has come before [it].”133 If 
the Supreme Court were to hold that a Federal Rule was in violation of the 
Rules Enabling Act, it would be forced to invalidate a Rule it chose to 
promulgate. Such an outcome is highly unlikely. Thus, when a court 
determines that a Federal Rule controls the federal law, the analysis is 
almost always over before it begins, and the court will almost certainly 
apply the federal law. 
should include a balancing of whether the state rule is “bound up” with substantive state rights and 
whether there is a strong federal interest in using federal procedure). 
128 Steinman, supra note 97, at 664. 
129 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012); see Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1941) (“Congress has 
undoubted power to regulate the practice and procedure of federal courts . . . but it has never essayed to 
declare the substantive state law . . . .” (emphasis added)).  
130 Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 6 (1987).  
131 For a discussion of the Supreme Court decisions describing a Rules Enabling Act analysis prior 
to Burlington Northern, see Condlin, supra note 86, at 5–20. 
132 Burlington Northern, 480 U.S. at 5; see also Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. 
Co., 559 U.S. 393, 407 (2010) (plurality opinion) (“The test is not whether the rule affects a litigant’s 
substantive rights; most procedural rules do.”).  
133 Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., 559 U.S. at 407 (plurality opinion); see Condlin, supra note 
86, at 3 (“[T]he Supreme Court never has found a Federal Rule invalid . . . .”); Millar & Coalson, supra 
note 73, at 540–41 (“Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are entitled to a strong presumption of validity 
[and] [i]n fact, no Federal Rule of Civil Procedure has ever been declared invalid under either the U.S. 
Constitution or the Rules Enabling Act.”).  
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It is also critical to stress that unlike a Rules of Decision Act analysis, 
when performing a Rules Enabling Act analysis, courts are generally not 
concerned with the state law at issue or the state law’s substantive or 
procedural purpose. “[T]he validity of a Federal Rule depends entirely 
upon whether it regulates procedure,” and if it does, it is valid “regardless 
of its incidental effect upon state-created rights.”134 Thus, that a state law 
may conflict with the federal law is wholly irrelevant to the analysis. 
The remainder of this Note explores whether a federal court sitting in 
diversity jurisdiction would likely use state or federal law in determining 
the validity of a cy pres award to distribute unclaimed settlement funds 
where the state and federal law conflict. Part III, consistent with the Court’s 
precedent in Gasperini, hypothesizes that courts will determine that the 
standard for enforcement of cy pres is one of judicial common law, and 
thus conduct a Rules of Decision Act analysis. Part IV, on the other hand, 
suggests that a Rules Enabling Act analysis is more appropriate because cy 
pres awards are derived from Rule 23(e), consistent with Justice Scalia’s 
opinion in Shady Grove. As will be discussed, the two analyses lead to 
different results. If a federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction uses a 
Rules of Decision Act to analyze a conflict between federal and state law, 
the result will depend on the nature of the conflict—whether the federal 
law conflicts with a state cy pres statute or a state unclaimed property 
statute. By contrast, if a federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction uses a 
Rules Enabling Act analysis, the court is likely to apply federal law. 
Finally, Part V will argue that the Rule 23 Subcommittee’s April 2015 
proposal to codify cy pres awards as a part of Rule 23(e)—and the 
Subcommittee’s subsequent withdrawal of the proposal in November 
2015—lends support to the argument that cy pres awards are in fact derived 
from Rule 23(e) and may even violate the Rules Enabling Act. 
134 Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., 559 U.S. at 410 (plurality opinion); see also MULLENIX ET
AL., supra note 127, at 670 (“The [Shady Grove] Court emphasized that for purposes of [a Rules 
Enabling Act] analysis, it is not the substantive or procedural nature or purpose of the affected state law 
that matters, but rather the substantive or procedural nature of the federal rule.”). Note, however, that in 
his Shady Grove concurrence, Justice Stevens suggested an “application of the [Rules] Enabling Act 
[that] shows sensitivity” to the state law. 559 U.S. at 424 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring 
in the judgment) (internal quotation marks omitted). Justice Stevens concluded that sometimes a federal 
court sitting in diversity must apply the state procedural rule; he stated that a 
[F]ederal [R]ule . . . cannot govern a particular case in which the rule would displace a state law
that is procedural in the ordinary use of the term but is so intertwined with a state right or
remedy that it functions to define the scope of the state-created right. And absent a governing
federal rule, a federal court must engage in the traditional Rules of Decision Act inquiry, under
the Erie line of cases.
Id. at 423–24. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1118 
III. THE LIKELY APPROACH: A RULES OF DECISION ACT ANALYSIS
It is likely that a federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction would
conduct a Rules of Decision Act analysis to determine whether federal or 
state cy pres law should apply where they conflict. First, the court would 
likely determine that federal common law—not Rule 23(e)—governs cy 
pres awards. Judges have created requirements to determine the validity of 
cy pres remedies. Second, the court would conduct a Rules of Decision Act 
analysis using the modified outcome determination test. 
A. The Argument That Judge-Made Common Law
Governs Cy Pres Awards 
The argument that a Rules of Decision Act analysis applies would 
start by highlighting that federal cy pres doctrine in the class action context 
developed through judge-made common law, and therefore, cy pres awards 
are not controlled by Rule 23(e)(2). It would point to the fact that Rule 
23(e) does not define any specific test to determine whether a settlement 
involving a cy pres award is “fair, reasonable, and adequate.”135 Instead, 
according to this line of reasoning, courts have created common law 
requirements, and “judicial interpretation differs [in applying these 
requirements], resulting in confusion and inconsistent outcomes.”136  
First, judges have created a “trigger requirement,” requiring some 
difficulty in distributing settlement awards to class members in order to 
justify a cy pres remedy.137 Courts vary, however, in how challenging 
effective distribution of funds to the actual class members must be. For 
example, some courts require that it be “infeasible” to compensate actual 
class members before providing a cy pres award to a nonprofit 
organization,138 while others have no such requirement.139 
Second, courts have designed a “nexus requirement,” mandating 
“there be a connection—or nexus—between the harm that the plaintiffs 
135 Bartholomew, supra note 3, at 3252; see FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2). 
136 Bartholomew, supra note 3, at 3252. 
137 Id. at 3252–53. 
138 See, e.g., Pearson v. NBTY, Inc., 772 F.3d 778, 784 (7th Cir. 2014) (holding that a settlement 
agreement including a $1.13 million cy pres award to the Orthopedic Research and Education 
Foundation was invalid because it was feasible to mail $3 checks to each of the plaintiffs); In re Matzo 
Food Prods. Litig., 156 F.R.D. 600, 605 (D.N.J. 1994) (“Typically, the court employs cy pres where . . . 
distribution [is] economically impossible.”). 
139 See, e.g., In re Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 173 (3d Cir. 2013) (holding that it is 
not the job of the court “to determine whether the settlement is the fairest possible resolution” and thus 
declining “to hold that cy pres distributions are only appropriate” where further individual distributions 
are economically infeasible).  
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have suffered and the benefit the cy pres distribution will provide.”140 For 
instance, the Ninth Circuit has held that to meet the nexus requirement, “[a] 
cy pres award must be guided by (1) the objectives of the underlying 
statute(s),” “(2) the interests of the silent class members,” and (3) “must not 
benefit a group too remote from the plaintiff class.”141 In contrast, the Third 
Circuit recently added the requirement that courts must evaluate cy pres 
awards as part of a class settlement based on “the degree of direct benefit 
provided to the class.”142 The Seventh Circuit, on the other hand, has held 
that cy pres remedies lacking any direct or indirect benefits to the class 
could be valid.143  
Advocates for a Rules of Decision Act analysis would also point to 
Supreme Court precedent that takes a narrow approach to interpreting the 
Federal Rules.144 They would contend that the judge-made trigger and 
nexus requirement tests used to determine whether a cy pres settlement is 
fair under Rule 23(e) are akin to the shock the conscience test used to 
determine whether a verdict is excessive as to warrant a new trial under 
Rule 59 in Gasperini.145 Therefore, a court could reason that just as the 
Court in Gasperini held that a federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction 
should use a Rules of Decision Act analysis to determine whether to apply 
federal or state law in the context of a motion for new trial due to excessive 
damages, so too should a federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction use a 
Rules of Decision Act analysis to determine whether to apply federal or 
state law in the context of evaluating the validity of a cy pres award as an 
aspect of a class action settlement agreement.  
The Fifth Circuit—the only federal appellate court to examine a 
conflict of federal and state law relating to a cy pres award—determined 
140 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 1, § 12.33; see also id. § 12.33 n.3 (discussing circuit and district court 
cases requiring a nexus from the First, Third, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits).  
141 Dennis v. Kellogg Co., 697 F.3d 858, 865 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted); see also Nachshin v. AOL, LLC, 663 F.3d 1034, 1038–39 (9th Cir. 2011). This nexus 
requirement focuses on the purpose of the statute rather than the specific claim. In other words, “it is 
enough for a charitable distribution to advance judicial access or consumer protection research; the 
distribution’s use need not perfectly align with the specific facts of the case.” Bartholomew, supra note 
3, at 3254–55. 
142 Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d at 174 (emphasis added). The court held that in 
evaluating direct benefit, it can consider “among other things, the number of individual awards 
compared to both the number of claims and the estimated number of class members, the size of the 
individual awards compared to claimants’ estimated damages, and the claims process used to determine 
individual awards.” Id. 
143 See Hughes v. Kore of Ind. Enter., Inc., 731 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2013). 
144 See supra note 97 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s narrow interpretation of Rule 
59 in Gasperini and Rule 3 in Walker). 
145 See supra notes 91–96 and accompanying text. 
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that cy pres was governed by judge-made common law.146 Thus, to 
determine if state or federal law should apply, the court utilized a Rules of 
Decision Act analysis. The court stressed that “Rule 23(e) . . . contains no 
categorical rule entitling plaintiffs to cy pres distribution—and, in fact, 
does not mention cy pres distribution at all.”147 The Rule “merely 
empowers a district court to approve a settlement [and] does not mention 
the district court’s discretion—or even its authority—to extinguish the right 
of recovery of identified class members through a later cy pres order.”148 
Other courts may well follow the Fifth Circuit’s lead in future cases 
examining conflicts between state and federal law.  
B. Rules of Decision Act Analysis
If a federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction decides that a Rules of 
Decision Act analysis is appropriate, as it likely would, it would use the 
modified outcome determination test to decide whether federal or state law 
should apply. Courts must examine whether the difference in outcome from 
using state or federal law would meaningfully impact forum shopping or 
result in an inequitable administration of justice.149 Federal law regarding 
the issue of cy pres remedies as a class action settlement may conflict with 
two different kinds of state laws: state cy pres statutes or state unclaimed 
property statutes. Under a Rules of Decision Act analysis, the answer to 
whether state or federal law should apply would depend on the specific 
nature of the conflict.  
First, twenty-one states have cy pres statutes that codify specific 
requirements for cy pres awards as a part of a class action settlement 
agreement.150 Some state statutes mandate that unclaimed settlement funds 
be distributed as a cy pres remedy to legal aid organizations.151 Other state 
statutes codify cy pres awards as valid forms of class action relief but do 
not designate specific legal aid charities as recipients.152 These requirements 
may conflict with the federal common law requirements for cy pres 
remedies. Depending on the language of each specific state statute, the 
146 All Plaintiffs v. All Defendants, 645 F.3d 329, 335–37 (5th Cir. 2011). 
147 Id. at 333. 
148 Id. at 334. 
149 See supra notes 113–16 and accompanying text. The issue of whether a cy pres remedy is an 
available option as part of a settlement agreement does not impact the judge–jury allocation of power. 
Therefore, the Byrd balancing test is not appropriate. 
150 See supra Section II.D.1. 
151 See supra note 69 and accompanying text (Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Montana, 
North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Washington, and Wisconsin). 
152 See supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text (California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Louisiana, 
Maine, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Mexico, and Tennessee). 
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statute may or may not require a “trigger” or “nexus” between the absent 
class members and the charity organization. Moreover, federal cy pres 
rules, unlike some state statutes, do not require or suggest specific legal aid 
charities as recipients and do not place minimums on the percent of 
unclaimed settlement funds that must be disbursed to the specified 
organization.  
Despite the difference between federal and state cy pres law, under the 
modified outcome determination test, it is likely that where federal cy pres 
law and a state cy pres statute conflict, a federal court sitting in diversity 
jurisdiction would use federal law. The difference in outcome from using 
federal law as opposed to the state law is unlikely to lead to unfair 
treatment of the litigants and unlikely to impact forum shopping or result in 
an inequitable administration of justice. As long as some sort of cy pres 
award is available to plaintiffs as an option for settlement, the outcome for 
the plaintiff class will be largely the same: a sizeable settlement involving a 
cy pres award. The only difference may be what specific organization 
receives the cy pres award. Moreover, while some state statutes—unlike 
federal cy pres law—mandate cy pres awards, they do so out of the 
proportion of settlement funds that go unclaimed. Those distinctions are 
unlikely to matter to plaintiffs, to meaningfully impact forum shopping, or 
to result in an inequitable administration of justice.  
The second possible conflict between state and federal law in the cy 
pres context involves state unclaimed property laws. Every state has an 
unclaimed property statute.153 In instances where funds remain after 
settlement, courts must determine whether to distribute the funds as a cy 
pres award to the charitable organization specified in the settlement or to 
allocate the funds to the state based on the unclaimed property law. The 
Fifth Circuit confronted such a conflict in All Plaintiffs v. All Defendants,154 
a class action antitrust lawsuit filed against various oil companies.155 The 
parties agreed to a settlement, but there were over $10 million of unclaimed 
funds due to uncashed checks, checks returned as undeliverable, and 
settlement awards that were of a de minimis amount.156 The district court 
distributed the leftover funds through a cy pres remedy to the Center for 
Energy and Environmental Resources at the University of Texas.157 The 
issue in the case was whether the unclaimed funds should have instead 
been governed by Texas’s Unclaimed Property Act and therefore been 
153 See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
154 645 F.3d 329 (5th Cir. 2011).  
155 Id. at 330. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. at 331. 
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returned to the state.158 If the court instead were to honor the cy pres 
agreement under federal law, it would be forced to ignore the state statute 
governing unclaimed property. 
The Fifth Circuit determined that Rule 23(e) does not govern federal 
cy pres doctrine159 and instead conducted a Rules of Decision Act analysis. 
And under a Rules of Decision Act analysis, the court held that the state 
unclaimed property act must apply, and the unclaimed settlement funds 
therefore must escheat to the state.160 The court analyzed forum shopping 
and inequitable administration of justice as part of Hanna’s “twin aims” 
test.161 First, the court summarily concluded that “the availability of cy pres 
does not pose a significant threat of forum-shopping by plaintiffs.”162 This 
part of the court’s analysis leaves something to be desired. It is possible, for 
example, that if federal cy pres law, and not a state’s unclaimed property 
law, applied in federal courts, parties could seek to litigate in federal court 
to avoid any possible impact that an unclaimed property law may have in 
settlement negotiations.163  
Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit correctly determined that “permitting 
federal courts to disregard the Unclaimed Property Act in favor of cy pres 
distribution, while state courts follow the Act, would lead to the inequitable 
administration of justice.”164 As the court held, if the federal court could 
apply federal cy pres law and disregard Texas’s unclaimed property act, 
“identified class members who would have a right to recover their property 
from the State under the Act would instead lose that right of recovery 
forever . . . solely because the case was in federal court.”165 In addition, the 
court stressed that Texas’s possessory interest in the unclaimed funds 
would be extinguished, and Texas would lose its “enforceable property 
right in the income from [the] unclaimed property,” again purely because 
158 Id.; see TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 72.001–74.710 (West 2016). 
159 All Plaintiffs, 645 F.3d at 333–35. 
160 Id. at 337. 
161 Id. at 336. The Fifth Circuit, however, misinterpreted Gasperini, incorrectly concluding that the 
Byrd balancing test functioned “side by side” with Hanna. Id. The court failed to recognize that Justice 
Ginsburg specified a specific situation where the Byrd test is applicable: when judge–jury allocation of 
power was at issue. See supra notes 125–27 and accompanying text. Thus, the court’s consideration of 
Byrd balancing, see All Plaintiffs, 645 F.3d at 337, was in error. In any event, the court’s Byrd 
discussion was brief and did not impact the court’s analysis of forum shopping and the inequitable 
administration of justice; therefore, it did not appear to influence its opinion. 
162 All Plaintiffs, 645 F.3d at 336. 
163 See Millar & Coalson, supra note 73, at 545 (noting though that “such a prospect is dubious at 
best”).  
164 All Plaintiffs, 645 F.3d at 337. 
165 Id. 
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the “case happened to be settled in federal, rather than state, court.”166 The 
Fifth Circuit’s reasoning is sound, and the court was correct that this 
situation presented an “inequitable administration of justice.”167 Put simply, 
if the court were to use federal rather than state law, the difference in 
outcome would cause “an unfair result to the litigants.”168 Therefore, under 
a Rules of Decision Act analysis, a federal court sitting in diversity 
jurisdiction should honor state unclaimed property statutes, even at the 
expense of disregarding a settlement containing a cy pres award that would 
otherwise be valid under federal law. 
IV. AN ALTERNATE APPROACH: RULES ENABLING ACT ANALYSIS
In contrast to the Rules of Decision Act analysis discussed in Part III,
it is more appropriate for a federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction to 
use a Rules Enabling Act analysis to determine whether to apply federal or 
state law where they conflict on the issue of class action cy pres remedies. 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) clearly outlines the requirements for 
class action settlements. All aspects of a class action settlement, including a 
cy pres award, must comply with the Rule. Under a Rules Enabling Act 
analysis, it is likely a federal court would apply federal cy pres law, honor 
the settlement agreement, and disregard a state’s cy pres law or unclaimed 
property act.  
A. The Argument that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)
Governs Cy Pres Awards 
When adversarial parties agree to a cy pres award, the plaintiff class 
and defendants must agree to the arrangement by a formal settlement 
agreement. Thus, before a court permits such a settlement, including a cy 
pres award, they must ensure that all requirements of Rule 23(e) are met. 
Most notably, the court must determine whether the settlement is “fair, 
reasonable, and adequate” in accordance with Rule 23(e)(2).169 Therefore, 
under the principle that the greater includes the lesser, where a settlement 
includes a cy pres remedy, Rule 23(e)(2) governs a court’s decision in 
166 Id. It is relevant to note that this part of the Fifth Circuit’s analysis considers the “inequitable 
administration of justice” prong of the Hanna test with respect to a nonparty, the state of Texas. While 
acknowledging that “some aspects of the ‘twin aims’ analysis—in particular, the focus on forum 
shopping—seem better suited to disputes between plaintiffs and defendants, rather than those involving 
post-judgment intervenors,” the Court was nevertheless willing to consider Texas’s interest as part of its 
analysis. Id.  
167 Id. 
168 See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
169 FED R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2). 
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judging the validity of the cy pres award. A cy pres award must also be 
“fair, reasonable, and adequate.”170  
As the Court held in Shady Grove, “Rule 23 provides a one size-fits-
all formula for deciding the class-action question.”171 In Shady Grove, the 
Court used a Rules Enabling Act analysis despite the vagueness of Rule 
23(b)(3)’s predominance and superiority requirements and despite the fact 
that federal common law governs their interpretation.172 Likewise, a federal 
court should use a Rules Enabling Act analysis despite the vagueness in 
Rule 23(e)(2)’s requirement that settlements and cy pres awards are “fair, 
reasonable and adequate” and despite the fact that federal common law 
governs the validity of cy pres awards. Thus, where federal cy pres law 
conflicts with state law, a court need not “wade into Erie’s murky 
waters.”173 Instead, it must simply determine whether Rule 23(e) is 
consistent with the Rules Enabling Act.174 
Moreover, Rule 23(e) clearly conflicts with both state cy pres statutes 
and state unclaimed property acts. Rule 23(e) sets the requirements for all 
class action settlements, including distribution of leftover funds as cy pres 
awards. The conflict with state cy pres statutes, which also set out the 
requirements for the distribution of leftover funds as cy pres awards, is 
clear. The conflict with state unclaimed property acts is less obvious, but 
still present. Both Rule 23(e) and state unclaimed property laws “attempt[] 
to answer the same question”175: what to do with unclaimed funds after a 
class action settlement agreement. 
B. Rules Enabling Act Analysis
As discussed in Part II, courts are extremely hesitant to declare that a 
Federal Rule violates the Rules Enabling Act. The Supreme Court has 
never invalidated a Federal Rule and largely defers to the judgment of the 
Rules Advisory Committee.176 Thus, if a court were to glean cy pres awards 
170 See Millar & Coalson, supra note 73, at 538 (“If a court has the discretion to approve (or 
disapprove) a settlement based on its fairness and reasonableness, then the court necessarily has the 
power to approve each of the provisions in the settlement agreement—including those involving the 
treatment of unclaimed settlement proceeds.”).  
171 559 U.S. 393, 399 (2010) (plurality opinion).  
172 See supra notes 106–09 and accompanying text.  
173 Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., 559 U.S. at 398 (plurality opinion). 
174 If at some point in the future, a specific cy pres provision is added to Rule 23(e) similar to the 
Rule 23 Subcommittee April 2015 proposal, see infra note 182 and accompanying text, a federal court 
would definitely conduct a Rules Enabling Act analysis. The Subcommittee’s subsequent withdrawal of 
the proposed amendment has interesting implications. See infra Part V. 
175 Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., 559 U.S. at 399 (plurality opinion). 
176 See supra Section II.A.2.  
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from Rule 23(e), it is likely that a federal court sitting in diversity 
jurisdiction would apply the federal law. As the Court held in Shady Grove, 
Rule 23 does not violate the Rules Enabling Act because “[a] class 
action . . . merely enables a federal court to adjudicate claims of multiple 
parties.”177 Therefore, Rule 23 regulates procedure such that any impact on 
substantive law would be incidental. Likewise, a court specifically 
examining the validity of Rule 23(e) would likely, almost by default, 
determine that Rule 23(e) is a procedural tool to permit class action 
settlement agreements. It would likely find that any impact Rule 23(e) has 
on substantive law would be incidental to that purpose, and therefore, 
comply with the Rules Enabling Act under the Burlington Northern test.178  
Under this analysis, a federal court would approve any settlement 
agreement between class action plaintiffs and defendants consistent with 
Rule 23(e), including any cy pres agreement that it determines is “fair, 
reasonable, and adequate.” State law would not bind a federal court sitting 
in diversity jurisdiction. Thus, a federal court would not be obligated to 
follow a state cy pres statute’s specific guidelines—for example, the 
mandate that funds go to legal aid charities.179 Similarly, a federal court 
sitting in diversity jurisdiction would not be obligated to adhere to the 
terms of a state’s unclaimed property statute and would not be obligated to 
escheat unclaimed settlement funds to the state.180 The court would not 
concern itself with the substantive or procedural purposes behind the state 
laws. Instead, the court would just need to ensure that the settlement—
including the cy pres award that is a part of the settlement—complies with 
the broad guidelines of Rule 23(e). Any substantive impact that a particular 
settlement and its terms would have on state cy pres or unclaimed property 
law is irrelevant under this analysis because a court would likely determine 
that it is incidental to the procedural purpose of Rule 23(e). 
V. THE IMPACT OF THE RULE 23 SUBCOMMITTEE’S PROPOSAL—
AND ITS SUBSEQUENT WITHDRAWAL 
In April 2015, the Rule 23 Subcommittee proposed an amendment to 
Rule 23(e) to explicitly codify cy pres remedies; the proposed Rule 
177 Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., 559 U.S. at 408 (plurality opinion). 
178 See, e.g., In re Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 173 n.8 (3d Cir. 2013) (noting, in 
dicta, that a cy pres award as a part of a settlement does not violate the Rules Enabling Act because the 
“certification of a settlement simply recognizes the parties’ deliberate decision to bind themselves 
according to mutually agreed-upon terms without engaging in any substantive adjudication of the 
underlying causes of action” (quoting Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 312 (3d Cir. 2011))). 
179 For state-specific cy pres statutes, see supra notes 67–71. 
180 Every state has an unclaimed property statute. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
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23(e)(3) would have allowed federal courts to “approve a [settlement] 
proposal that includes a cy pres remedy.”181 The proposal provided specific 
guidelines as to when a cy pres award would, and would not, be 
appropriate:  
(A) If individual class members can be identified through reasonable effort,
and the distributions are sufficiently large to make individual distributions
economically viable, settlement proceeds must be distributed directly to
individual class members;
(B) If the proposal involves individual distributions to class members and
funds remain after distributions, the settlement must provide for further
distributions to participating class members unless the amounts involved are
too small to make individual distributions economically viable or other
specific reasons exist that would make such further distributions impossible or
unfair;
(C) The proposal may provide that, if the court finds that individual
distributions are not viable under Rule 23(e)(3)(A) or (B), a cy pres approach
may be employed if it directs payment to a recipient whose interests
reasonably approximate those being pursued by the class.182
Ultimately, the Rule 23 Subcommittee opted to remove the cy pres 
amendment from its agenda.183 Nevertheless, the proposal—and its 
withdrawal—provide two key insights into the way in which a federal court 
sitting in diversity jurisdiction should analyze a conflict between federal 
and state law involving a cy pres award as part of a class action settlement: 
(1) Rule 23(e) governs cy pres awards and (2) courts should more closely
examine whether cy pres awards violate the Rules Enabling Act.
First, the Rule 23 Subcommittee’s proposal demonstrates that Rule 
23(e) in fact governs cy pres awards, notwithstanding the Subcommittee’s 
subsequent failure to enact the proposal. There is a reason that the 
Subcommittee went straight to Rule 23(e) to codify class action cy pres 
remedies. It recognized that the modern class action cy pres award is an 
aspect of a class action settlement that the court must approve based on 
Rule 23(e)’s requirements. The Subcommittee’s initial desire to amend 
Rule 23(e) leaves little doubt that cy pres remedies are “covered by one of 
the Federal Rules.”184 Therefore, “the question facing the court [sitting in 
diversity jurisdiction] is a far cry from the typical . . . Erie choice,”185 but 
instead is an examination of whether Rule 23(e) violates the Rules 
181 APRIL 2015 RULE 23 SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 9, at 23. 
182 Id. at 23–24. 
183 NOVEMBER 2015 RULE 23 SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 12, at 46. 
184 See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965). 
185 Id. 
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Enabling Act. A Rules Enabling Act analysis—and not a Rules of Decision 
Act analysis—is appropriate. 
Although it is true that Federal Rules have a strong presumption of 
validity,186 the decision to analyze an issue under the Rules Enabling Act 
rather than the Rules of Decision Act “is by no means to concede the 
validity of all Federal Rules, for the Enabling Act contains significant 
limiting language of its own.”187 The Rules Enabling Act limits the Rules 
by providing that they “shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive 
right.”188 Professor Ely has suggested that the Court in Hanna recognized 
that the “Enabling Act constitutes the only check on the Rules—that ‘Erie’ 
does not stand there as a backstop,” and therefore, that courts should “take 
the Act’s limiting language more seriously than it has in the past.”189  
Professor Martin Redish has argued that cy pres awards violate the 
Rules Enabling Act.190 According to Professor Redish, “[s]ubstantive laws 
necessarily contain two elements: a behavioral proscription and an 
enforcement mechanism.”191 The behavioral proscription is the aspect of a 
law that regulates behavior.192 The enforcement mechanism, on the other 
hand, compensates injured parties and provides punitive remedies to 
wrongdoers.193 Professor Redish contends that a Rule 23(e) settlement that 
includes a cy pres award transforms a substantive right: it modifies the 
enforcement mechanism of the underlying substantive law from one of 
compensating plaintiffs to one imposing of civil fines on defendants.194 
Several lower federal courts have recognized Professor Redish’s 
concerns.195  
The Rule 23 Subcommittee, in deciding to withdrawal its proposal to 
codify cy pres as part of Rule 23(e), explicitly identified the Rules Enabling 
186 See supra notes 130–33 and accompanying text. 
187 Ely, supra note 82, at 698.  
188 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012).  
189 Ely, supra note 82, at 698. 
190 See Redish et. al., supra note 4, at 644–48. 
191 Id. at 644.  
192 Id. at 644–45. 
193 Id. at 645. 
194 Id. at 647 (“[I]nvocation of cy pres in the class action context alters substantially the DNA of 
the underlying substantive law . . . .”). 
195 See, e.g., Klier v. Elf Atochem North America, Inc., 658 F.3d 468, 481 (5th Cir. 2011) (Jones, 
J., concurring) (“Cy pres distributions arguably violate the Rules Enabling Act by using a wholly 
procedural device—the class-action mechanism as prescribed in Rule 23—to transform substantive law 
‘from a compensatory remedial structure to the equivalent of a civil fine.’” (quoting Redish et al., supra 
note 4, at 623)); In re Thornburg Mortg., Inc. Sec. Litig., 885 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1110–11 (D.N.M. 
2012) (holding that “cy pres awards are a bad idea and inappropriate,” and citing favorably Professor 
Redish’s critique of cy pres awards—including the Rules Enabling Act concerns). 
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Act concern. In explaining its decision, the Subcommittee noted that 
“adopting such a provision would raise genuine [Rules] Enabling Act 
concerns,” and thus concluded that “uneasiness about the proper limits of 
the rulemaking authority cautioned against adopting a freestanding 
provision on cy pres provisions.”196 In other words, the Subcommittee 
withdrew its proposal in order to maintain the status quo and allow federal 
courts to continue to enforce cy pres remedies as part of settlement 
agreements without the risk of Rules Enabling Act scrutiny. The 
Subcommittee likely realized that explicitly codifying cy pres awards in 
Rule 23 would eliminate any doubt that cy pres remedies must be examined 
under the Rules Enabling Act, and would make Rule 23(e)’s potential 
violation of the Enabling Act too obvious to ignore.197  
Courts should not ignore Rules Enabling Act concerns merely because 
the Subcommittee withdrew the proposal. Instead, a federal court sitting in 
diversity jurisdiction, presented with a conflict between federal cy pres law 
and a state cy pres or unclaimed property statute, should still recognize that 
federal cy pres law derives from Rule 23(e). Thus, it should use a Rules 
Enabling Act rather than a Rules of Decision Act analysis. And despite the 
withdrawal, the court should examine the validity of cy pres remedies with 
a keen eye and seriously consider the Rules Enabling Act concerns 
identified by Professor Redish, several lower federal courts, and the 
Subcommittee itself.  
CONCLUSION 
A federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction may confront a 
situation in which it must determine the validity of a settlement containing 
a cy pres award. If the state in which the court sits has its own cy pres or 
unclaimed property statute, the court must first determine whether federal 
or state law applies. There is a lack of clarity as to whether cy pres awards 
should be derived from Rule 23(e) or federal judge-made common law, and 
therefore, it is unclear whether courts should use a Rules Enabling Act or 
Rules of Decision Act analysis in determining whether to apply federal or 
state law. But following the Rule 23 Subcommittee’s suggestion in April 
2015 to explicitly add a cy pres award provision to Rule 23(e), there is no 
longer a question. Courts should interpret cy pres awards as derived from 
and controlled by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Finally, because the 
Subcommittee rescinded their suggestion in November 2015 due to Rules 
196 NOVEMBER 2015 RULE 23 SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 12, at 46–47. 
197 For an in-depth discussion of the Rules Enabling Act concerns, see Redish et al., supra note 4, 
at 644–48.  
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Enabling Act concerns, courts should recognize that Rules Enabling Act 
concerns are legitimate.  
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